CAP Subsidies and the Productivity of EU Farms. Factor Markets Working Paper No. 37, March 2013 by Rizov, Marian et al.
FACTOR MARKETS Working Papers present work being conducted within the FACTOR MARKETS 
research project, which analyses and compares the functioning of factor markets for agriculture in the 
member states, candidate countries and the EU as a whole, with a view to stimulating reactions from other 
experts in the field. See the back cover for more information on the project. Unless otherwise indicated, the 
views expressed are attributable only to the authors in a personal capacity and not to any institution with 
which they are associated. 
Available for free downloading from the Factor Markets (www.factormarkets.eu) 
and CEPS (www.ceps.eu) websites 
ISBN 978-94-6138-293-1 
© Copyright 2013 Marian Rizov, Jan Pokrivcak and Pavel Ciaian 
FACTOR MARKETS Coordination: Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), 1 Place du Congrès, 1000 Brussels, 
Belgium Tel: +32 (0)2 229 3911 • Fax: +32 (0)2 229 4151 • E-mail: info@factormarkets.eu • web: www.factormarkets.eu 
 
CAP Subsidies and the Productivity  
of EU Farms 
ABSTRACT 
This paper investigates the impact of subsidies from the common agricultural policy on the total 
factor productivity of farms in the EU. We employ a structural, semi-parametric estimation 
algorithm, directly incorporating the effect of subsidies into a model of unobserved productivity. 
We empirically study the effects using samples from the Farm Accountancy Data Network for EU-
15 countries. Our main findings are clear: subsidies had a negative impact on farm productivity in 
the period before the decoupling reform was implemented; after decoupling the effect of subsidies 
on productivity was more nuanced, as in several countries it turned positive.  
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CAP Subsidies and the Productivity  
of EU Farms 
Marian Rizov, Jan Pokrivcak and Pavel Ciaian* 
Factor Markets Working Paper No. 37/March 2013 
1. Introduction 
The EU farm sector is heavily subsidised. Annually, the EU spends around €50 billion on the 
common agricultural policy (CAP) with the primary goal of supporting farmers’ income and 
alleviating the environmental impact of agricultural production. Certainly, CAP subsidies 
impact on farm sector productivity as well.  
There are two competing, policy-relevant arguments regarding the impact of agricultural 
subsidies on productivity. In the context of the trade liberalisation process of the World 
Trade Organisation (WTO), the discussion centres on the distortionary impact of subsidies 
on agricultural markets (including on productivity) and how the effects differ among 
different types of subsidies. Following the WTO agenda, many countries have decoupled their 
agricultural subsidies with the aim of reducing distortionary agricultural support (Meléndez-
Ortíz et al., 2009).1Numerous papers, however, argue that indeed even decoupled subsidies 
may still affect production decisions and the productivity of farms.2Yet, recent developments 
in world markets, leading to increasing volatility of global food commodity prices and 
mounting concerns about food security in developing countries, are spurring calls to 
maintain the agricultural support stimulating farm investment and the adoption of 
productivity-enhancing modern technology (FAO, 2011). The European Commission 
explicitly mentions in its proposal for the post-2013 CAP the challenge of food security, and 
the EU’s goal to support the long-term potential of food supply and meet the growing world 
food demand (European Commission, 2010a, 2011). 
The impact of subsidies on agricultural production, input allocation and income distribution 
is well documented in the literature,3but significantly less attention has been devoted to the 
                                                        
* Marian Rizov is a reader in economics at the Middlesex University Business School, London; Jan 
Pokrivcak is a professor of Agricultural and International Economics at the Slovak University of 
Agriculture, Nitra; Pavel Ciaian is a researcher at the Joint Research Centre of the European 
Commission. 
We acknowledge the financial support from the European Commission FP7 project “Comparative 
Analysis of Factor Markets for Agriculture across the Member States”. We also acknowledge the 
financial support from Nadácia VÚB. We thank the Microeconomic Analysis Unit L.3 of the European 
Commission for granting access to the farm-level FADN data. We also thank Paolo Sckokai and Mario 
Veneziani for useful comments on the data and variables. The views expressed in the paper are purely 
those of the authors and may not in any circumstances be regarded as stating an official position of the 
European Commission. 
1 The eastern enlargement and budgetary problems of the EU have also affected the decoupling of farm 
subsidies. 
2 See Lagerkvist (2005), Ahearn et al. (2006), Goodwin and Mishra (2005, 2006), Vercammen (2007), 
Key and Roberts (2009), Whitaker (2009), Ciaian and Swinnen (2009), Bhaskar and Beghin (2010) 
and Carpentier et al. (2012). 
3 See for example, Alston and James (2002), Ridier and Jacquet (2002), Lagerkvist (2005), Goodwin 
and Mishra (2006), Serra et al. (2006), Sckokai and Moro (2009), Vercammen (2007), Féménia et al. 
(2010), Carpentier et al. (2012) and Weber and Key (2012). 
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impact of subsidies on the productivity of farms. Theoretical studies suggest that subsidies 
may have a positive impact on farm production and at the same time a negative impact on 
farm productivity (Hennessy, 1998; Ciaian and Swinnen, 2009). Still, these studies are 
inconclusive in predicting the exact relationship between agricultural subsidies and 
productivity, while the empirical literature finds mixed effects. The existing empirical studies 
employ a two-stage estimation approach, whereby efficiency measures are estimated in a first 
stage without controlling for subsidy effects, and then those efficiency measures are 
regressed on subsidies in a second stage.4 The disadvantage of such a two-stage approach is 
that it does not explicitly incorporate subsidies into a structural estimation algorithm and 
thus it cannot capture their true effect on productivity. The approach therefore results in 
biased estimates of the overall impact of subsidies on productivity.  
The present paper aims at filling the gap in the literature by investigating the impact of CAP 
subsidies on (aggregate) farm productivity, applying a structural productivity estimation 
approach based on Olley and Pakes (1996).We explicitly model unobserved productivity and 
directly incorporate the effects of subsidies into a structural, semi-parametric estimation 
algorithm. We apply the algorithm to the Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN) dataset 
and estimate total factor productivity (TFP)5 for large and representative samples of farms in 
the EU-15 over the period 1990–2008. Furthermore, special attention is paid to the 
significant change of regime through the decoupling of subsidies by the 2003 CAP reform. 
The paper compares the impact of subsidies on farm productivity before and after decoupling. 
We find that subsidies had a negative impact on productivity until the implementation of the 
decoupling reform. Afterwards, the effect of subsidies on farm productivity became more 
nuanced, as in several EU-15 countries it turned positive. In all cases the magnitude of the 
effect was small but economically important. From a policy perspective, this finding is 
important at least in the EU context, as according to the recent European Commission 
proposal the EU subsidy system is likely to continue after 2013.  
The paper is organised as follows. Next, we review relevant theoretical and empirical 
literature and set out our empirical approach. In section 3, we present our estimation 
algorithm. In section 4, we describe the FADN data and report the results of the production 
function estimation. In section 5, we verify the effects of subsidies on farm productivity by 
means of generalised method of moments (GMM) regressions. Section 6 summarises our 
findings and concludes.  
2. Subsidies and productivity: Findings in the literature 
Theoretical studies show that there are various channels through which subsidies impact on 
(aggregate) productivity (De Long and Summers, 1991; Blomstrom et al., 1996; Rajan and 
Zingales, 1998). They may either increase or decrease productivity and thus the net effect 
may be either positive or negative. The negative impact of subsidies on productivity may 
result from allocative (and technical) efficiency losses owing to distortions in the production 
structure and factor use, soft budget constraints and the shift of subsidies to less productive 
enterprises. The positive impact may stem from investment-induced productivity gains 
caused by the interaction of credit and risk attitudes with subsidies (subsidy-induced credit 
access, a lower cost of borrowing, a reduction in risk aversion and an increase in productive 
investment). 
Subsidies may negatively affect farm productivity because they distort the production 
structure of recipient farms, leading to allocative inefficiency. Recipient farms may modify 
their behaviour and start investing in subsidy-seeking activities that are relatively less 
                                                        
4 See for instance, Giannakas et al. (2001), Latruffe et al. (2009), Lakner (2009), Sauer and Park 
(2009), Zhu and Oude Lansink (2010), Latruffe et al. (2011) and Mary (2012). 
5 In this paper we define TFP as Hicks-neutral Solow residual, similar to Olley and Pakes (1996). 
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productive (Baumol, 1990; Alston and James, 2002). Allocative inefficiency may also be a 
result of distortions in input use. Subsidies give recipient farms an incentive to change their 
capital–labour ratio, which can lead to allocative inefficiency, i.e. over-investment in 
subsidised inputs. Subsidies may also give rise to technical inefficiency if they are captured by 
the farms, as higher profits lead to slack, a lack of effort and disinclination to seek cost-
improving methods (Leibenstein, 1966). Similarly, Kornai (1986) argues that subsidisation 
might give rise to soft budget constraints, which would lead to inefficient use of resources. If 
the budget constraint is hard, the farm will continually adjust to (unfavourable) external 
conditions by behaving in an entrepreneurial manner. If the budget constraint is soft, 
productive efforts are no longer imperative; the subsidy provider acts like an insurer taking 
over the moral hazard, while the insured (recipient farms) are less careful in protecting their 
wealth. Finally, subsidies may end up being transferred to less productive farms by policy-
makers ‘with special interests’, or as Olson (1982) asserts, subsidies may reduce the rate at 
which resources are reallocated from one activity to another in response to new technologies 
or market conditions. 
The literature on credit constraints and risk behaviour in agriculture (e.g. Blancard et al., 
2006; Ciaian and Swinnen, 2009; Kumbhakar and Bokusheva, 2009; Hüttel et al., 2010) 
asserts a positive relationship between subsidies and productivity. If farms are credit 
rationed, then subsidies may provide an additional source of financing, either directly by 
increasing farms’ financial resources or indirectly through improved access to formal credit. 
In other words, for credit-rationed farms subsidies may serve as a substitute for credit. 
Studies find that credit-constrained farms invest less and have lower allocative efficiency, 
which would improve as a result of subsidies.6 Cheaper credit would stimulate investments 
and input use, thus leading to improved farm performance. Farms that are not credit 
constrained may also be affected if subsidies present a cheaper source of financing than the 
credit available from the financial markets. Furthermore, Hennessy (1998) suggests that 
under uncertainty, subsidies affect markets through a wealth effect: subsidies affect farmers’ 
wealth and thus their risk attitudes. For example, farmers may be more willing to expand 
production through certain types of activities or employ additional factors that would 
otherwise be viewed as too risky (Roche and McQuinn, 2004).  
The negative effect of subsidies (allocative efficiency loss) is likely negatively and the positive 
effect (investment-induced productivity gain) is likely positively correlated with decoupling; 
thus one can expect that coupled subsidies will have a smaller positive or a larger negative 
impact on productivity relative to decoupled subsidies. First, the efficiency loss is stronger for 
coupled subsidies than for decoupled ones because farm eligibility for coupled payments is 
directly linked to farm factor and production decisions, which lead to higher allocative 
inefficiency. For the decoupled subsidies, the link to farm activities is weaker (Dewbre et al., 
2001; Guyomard et al., 2004; Courleux et al., 2008).7  Farm decisions are distorted by 
coupled subsidies towards subsidised activities and away from productivity-motivated 
activities. Second, the investment-induced productivity gain through the credit and risk 
channels is likely smaller for coupled than for decoupled payments (e.g. Ciaian and Swinnen, 
2009). The conditionality of coupled subsidies increases the monitoring costs of financial 
institutions if subsidies are used by credit-constrained farms as collateral for investment 
loans. For decoupled payments, the certainty of payment is higher given their link to land 
assets, which is relatively costless to monitor and less subject to production risk. 
                                                        
6 See Feder (1985) and Feder et al. (1990), and more recently, Blancard et al. (2006), Kumbhakar and 
Bokusheva (2009) and Hüttel et al. (2010). 
7 Farms receive CAP decoupled subsidies irrespective of their production and input use decisions, 
whereas CAP coupled subsides are related to the production of specific products or input use. The 
recipients of the decoupled payments need to fulfil only the so-called ‘cross-compliance conditions’, 
which means that to get subsidies, among other things, farms need to fulfil some agri-environmental 
conditions. 
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Findings in the empirical literature are mixed and inconclusive even though negative 
relations between CAP subsidies and productivity tend to prevail. In general, studies focus on 
the effects of coupled subsidies in narrowly defined agricultural industries. Latruffe et al. 
(2009) find a negative impact of coupled CAP subsidies on the efficiency of French farms 
specialised in cereals, oilseeds and beef production. Lakner (2009) shows that the agri-
environmental payments and investment programmes have a negative effect on the efficiency 
of organic dairy farms in Germany. The estimates of Zhu and Oude Lansink (2010) indicate 
that the negative efficiency effects of coupled subsidies prevail for crop farms in Germany, 
the Netherlands and Sweden. Similarly, Zhu et al. (2012) find that both output-related and 
input-related CAP subsidies had a negative impact on dairy farm efficiency in Germany and 
the Netherlands between 1995 and 2004, but no significant impact in Sweden. Their results 
also imply that a higher degree of coupling in farm support negatively affects farm efficiency. 
Latruffe et al. (2011) report a negative impact of total subsidies on dairy farms in seven EU 
countries (Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Spain, the Netherlands and the UK) for the 
period 1990–2007. Latruffe et al. (2011) also study the first years of decoupled payment 
implementation and their results indicate that in all countries except Denmark, the average 
technical efficiency was lower after decoupling. In contrast, Sauer and Park (2009) find a 
positive influence of organic subsidies on technical efficiency changes and technological 
changes for organic dairy farms in Denmark in the period 2002–04. Yee et al. (2004) also 
find a positive relation between the TFP of US farms and public expenditure on investment in 
research, extension and infrastructure. Mary (2012) estimates the impact of various types of 
CAP subsidies on the efficiency of French crop farms for the period 1996–2003. The coupled 
CAP payments (i.e. set-aside premiums, least favoured area payments and livestock subsidies) 
are found to have a negative impact on productivity. In contrast, targeted coupled subsidies 
that are not automatic but subject to project approval, such as investment and environmental 
measures, are found to have no significant impact on productivity. Furthermore, Mary (2012) 
finds that the Agenda 2000 reform (i.e. partial decoupling) had a positive impact on 
aggregate productivity.  
3. Estimation strategy: Linking productivity and subsidies 
3.1 Behavioural framework 
Our strategy for estimating productivity is built on the Olley and Pakes (1996) approach, 
which entails modelling unobserved productivity (TFP) and directly controlling for the effects 
of subsidies in the estimation algorithm.8 The strength of the approach lies in its flexibility in 
accommodating the specificities of the economic problem of interest and its efficiency in 
dealing with estimation biases. First, it allows us to control for the classic simultaneity bias 
(Marshak and Andrews, 1944) when estimating production functions, without having to rely 
on instruments. This is important, as we do not have good instruments available. The second 
advantage is that we can easily control for potential selection bias due to non-random exits.  
We extend the Olley and Pakes (1996) algorithm by explicitly allowing farm decisions and the 
market environment (factor markets and demand conditions) to be affected by the CAP 
subsidies, which we directly introduce into the underlying structural model of the farm. The 
single period profit function of farm j at time t is ),,(),,,( jtjtjtjtjtjtjt esicesk
rr −ωπ , where kjt 
and ωjt are the logs of the farm’s state variables, capital and (unobserved) productivity 
respectively, while ijt is the log of the farm’s investment. Both restricted profit π(.) and 
adjustment cost c(.) also depend on farm subsidies sjt and on jte
r
, which represents the 
                                                        
8 We do not estimate the effect of any particular channel through which subsidies interact with 
productivity; we estimate the net effect of allocative efficiency loss and the investment-induced 
productivity gain caused by subsidies. 
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economic environment that farms face at a particular point in time; jte
r
 captures the effects of 
input prices, demand conditions and industry characteristics. As in Olley and Pakes (1996), 
all these factors are assumed to change over time.  
The incumbent farm maximises its expected value of both current and future profits 
according to 
  
V(k jt,sjt,ω jt,r e jt) = max
Φ(k jt,sjt,ω jt,r e jt),
maxi jt {π(k jt,sjt,ω jt,r e jt) −c(i jt,sjt,r e jt) +
βE[V(k jt+1,sjt+1,ω jt+1,r e jt+1) | k jt,sjt,ω jt,r e jt,i jt]}.
⎧ 
⎨ ⎪ 
⎩ ⎪ 
 
(1) 
The Bellman equation explicitly considers two farm decisions. First is the exit decision:
),,,( jtjtjtjt esk
rωΦ  represents the sell-off value of the farm. Second is the investment decision 
ijt, which solves the interior maximisation problem. Under the assumption that equilibrium 
exists and that the difference in profits between the farm continuing and exiting is increasing 
in ωjt, we can write the optimal decision rule of a farm to remain in production as  
 ⎩
⎨⎧ ≥=Χ otherwise
eskif jtjtjttjt
jt 0
),,(1 rωω
 
(2) 
and the investment demand function as 
 
),,,( jtjtjtjttjt eskii
rω= . (3) 
The threshold function tω (.) as well as it(.) is determined as part of the Markov-perfect Nash 
equilibrium in decisions (Ericson and Pakes, 1995; Olley and Pakes, 1996) and depends on 
the state variables and the characteristics of the economic environment, including subsidies 
and factor prices. In the context of the CAP, farm capital stock might be related to the level of 
subsidies, which would lead to more capital-intensive farms. By incorporating the 
information on subsidies into the investment demand and exit rule explicitly, we can better 
control for differences in market conditions than when only controlling through the capital 
stock. Conditional on staying in production, the farm has to decide about its inputs, labour (l) 
and materials (m) use and investment (i). Investment determines the capital stock at the 
beginning of each period. The law of capital accumulation is given by kjt = (1 −δ)kjt-1 + ijt-1, 
where δ is the depreciation rate of capital.  
As in Olley and Pakes (1996), we assume that investment is monotonically increasing in 
productivity conditioned on the level of subsidies received. 9 Pakes (1994) discusses the 
conditions under which the investment demand function is strictly monotonic in ωjt. Abel 
and Eberly (1994) and several related papers, in a slightly different context, extend the 
analysis of monotonicity of investment and disinvestment regarding firm fundamentals and 
show that monotonicity brakes only at zero investment values.10 Recently, Hüttel et al. (2010) 
applied this result to an investment analysis of the German farm. Given monotonicity, 
investment can be inverted to generate the productivity function  
                                                        
9 The monotonicity needed in Olley and Pakes (1996) only requires the marginal product of capital to 
be increasing in productivity. In fact we argue here that the subsidy crucially improves monotonicity in 
the relationship between investment and productivity (in line with De Long and Summers, 1991 and 
Rajan and Zingales, 1998).  
10 We note that observations with zero net investment represent a very small proportion (between 0.5 
and 3.3%) in every country sample that we use in our empirical analysis. 
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),,,( jtjtjtjttjt eskih
r=ω .  (4) 
Furthermore, productivity is assumed to evolve according to a first-order Markov process 
with transition probability )|( 1−jtjtp ωω  and to be determined by a set of distributions 
conditional on the information at time t, which includes past (realised) productivity shocks. 
Given this distribution set, both the exit and investment decisions will crucially hinge upon 
the farm’s perception of the distribution of the future market structure given current 
information (past productivity). The decisions that farms take will in turn generate the 
distribution of the future market structure (Maskin and Tirole, 1988). 
3.2 Estimation algorithm 
Our estimation algorithm is similar to the one in Olley and Pakes (1996) except for the fact 
that the first-stage estimation and the survival equation include the subsidy variable and 
additional economic environment controls (as in Rizov and Walsh, 2009 and 2011).11 This 
way we have introduced subsidies as an additional control in the state space in the dynamic 
programme of the firm. The production function we estimate is specified as 
 jtjtjtkjtljtmjt
vklmy +++++= ωββββ0 , (5) 
where yjt is a log of gross real output and νjt is a random error term with a zero mean.  
Incorporating the productivity (inverted investment demand) function (4) into the 
production function (5) gives us  
 jtjtjtjtjttjtkjtljtmjt
eskihklmy νββββ +++++= ),,,(0 r . (6) 
In equation (6), as in Olley and Pakes (1996), the productivity function ht(.) is treated non-
parametrically using a polynomial. The non-parametric treatment, however, results in 
collinearity and requires ht(.), kjt and the constant to be combined into a function 
),,,,( jtjtjtjtjtt akeriφ , such that equation (5) becomes 
 jtjtjtjtjttjtljtmjt
eskilmy νφββ +++= ),,,( r , (7) 
which forms the first stage of our estimation algorithm and is estimated using OLS. In 
equation (7) subsidies are allowed to interact with the terms of the polynomial in capital and 
investment.12 
In the first stage of the estimation algorithm we can only identify materials and labour 
coefficients, while the capital coefficient has to be identified in the second stage of the 
algorithm. As in the original Olley and Pakes (1996) paper, farm labour is treated as a 
variable and non-dynamic input, which is a function of the state variables, including 
subsidies, and for which decisions are always made during the current period – an 
assumption introducing additional variation in the labour demand (Ackerberg et al., 2007). 
Materials are also treated as a fully variable and non-dynamic input on which decisions are 
                                                        
11 The market environment control vector 
jie
r  includes farm specialisation, location information at the 
NUTS3 (Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics) level and a time trend. 
12 In addition, to control for the nature of the subsidies, we use a dummy variable capturing the effect 
during the period after the decoupling of subsidies, which was actually implemented in 2005–06 
across the EU-15. We fully interact the dummy with the terms of the polynomial in the first-stage 
estimation equation.  
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always made after labour is chosen and given the contemporaneous realisation of 
productivity.13 In the first stage, we also estimate tφˆ , which allows us to express ωjt for use in 
the second stage as  
 jtkjtjt
kββφω −−= 0ˆˆ .  (8) 
Note that the first stage is not affected by endogenous selection because tφ  fully controls for 
the unobserved productivity, while by construction, 
jtν represents unobserved factors that 
are not known by the farmer before investment and exit decisions are made. In contrast, the 
second stage of the estimation algorithm is affected by endogenous selection because the exit 
decision in period t depends directly on ωjt.  
To clarify the timing of production decisions and their impact on the selection bias, we 
decompose jtω  into its conditional expectation given current information (past productivity) 
and a residual: jtjtjtjtjtjt gE ξωξωωω +=+= −− )(]|[ 11 . By construction, jtξ  is 
uncorrelated with information in t-1 and thus with kjt, which is chosen prior to time t. Note 
that the farm’s exit decision in period t depends directly on jtω  and thus the exit decision 
will be correlated with 
jtξ . This correlation relies on the assumption that farms exit 
production quickly, in the same period when the decision is made. If exit is decided in the 
period before the actual exit occurs, then even though there is a selection per se, exit will be 
uncorrelated with 
jtξ . To account for the impact of endogenous selection on productivity we 
extend the g(.) function as in Olley and Pakes (1996): 
 jtjtjtjt
Pg ξωω += − )ˆ,(' 1 , (9) 
where jtPˆ  is the estimated propensity-to-exit score, which controls for the impact of selection 
on the expectation of jtω , i.e. farms with lower survival probabilities that do survive to time t 
likely have higher jtω  than those with higher survival probabilities. We estimate jtPˆ  non-
parametrically using a probit model with a polynomial approximation. Note that we again 
extend the state variable set with information on subsidies, which are important 
determinants of a farm’s exit decision.14 
                                                        
13 We consider demand for materials, similar to labour demand, to be a function of the state variables 
and subsidies. In addition, we assume that labour also affects demand for materials: mjt = mt(ωjt, kjt, sjt, 
ljt , jte
r ), however, the timing of decisions on labour and materials demand differs within each period. 
We note that the partial dependence of materials on labour demand brings additional variation, which 
breaks the possible collinearity with the non-parametric function in equation (7).  
14 In our FADN data, exit from the sample is affected not only by the decision of the farm to exit 
production as described in our behavioural framework, but also by the survey design and selection 
rules. Given the possibility that FADN selection rules might not be random but are affected by farm 
productivity and the allocation of subsidies, controlling for selection remains important. FADN 
selection rules may not be random because they depend on the importance of farm types in the total 
population. For example, if the importance of a certain farm type decreases in the total population, 
then also the number of these farms in the FADN sample will be reduced. This is done to preserve the 
representativeness of the FADN sample. If the selection is in fact random, then the selection correction 
is still perfectly valid; it just should not change the estimates by much (Ackerberg et al., 2007).  
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The capital coefficient is identified in the second stage of our estimation algorithm. 
Incorporating equations (9) and (8) into equation (5) gives us 
 
,),ˆ(' 11 jtjtjtkjtjtkjtljtmjt Pkgklmy εβφβββ +−+=−− −− )
))
 
(10) 
where the two 0β  terms are encompassed in the non-parametric function, g’(.) and jtε  is a 
composite error term comprised of 
jtν  and jtξ . The lagged 1ˆ −jtφ  variable is obtained from 
the first-stage estimates at the t-1 period. Because the conditional expectation of jtω  given 
current information depends on 1−jtω , we need to use estimates of φˆ  from the t-1 period. 
Equation (10) is estimated by a non-linear least squares search routine approximating g’(.) 
with a polynomial.15 
Similar to Olley and Pakes (1996), we use the estimated (consistent) production function 
coefficients to obtain unbiased farm-specific, time-varying, total factor productivity (tfp) 
measures as residuals from the production function:  
 
)ˆˆˆexp( jtkjtljtmjtjt klmytfp βββ −−−= . (11) 
Clearly, the modified two-stage estimation algorithm has an impact on the estimated 
production function coefficients. Compared with the OLS estimator, we expect materials and 
labour coefficients to be lower, since materials and labour demands have a stronger positive 
correlation with the productivity shock. The direction of the bias in the capital coefficient is 
less clear, as it has an impact both through the selection equation and directly through the 
productivity shock. However, the variation in the capital stock that is attributed to the 
variation in output – purified from the variation in materials and labour – is now conditioned 
on the subsidy level of the farm and other economic environment controls. Due to the 
positive correlation between regional productivity and the subsidy level, farms receiving 
higher per-unit subsidies – on average – tend to be more capital intensive.16 Therefore, in 
order to recover the correct estimates of the production function, it is important to control for 
the effect of subsidies that works both through the instantaneous productivity shock 
impacting materials and labour demand and over time through the capital accumulation 
process. Thus, the resulting tfp measures are obtained controlling for the fact that market 
conditions are different and evolve differently according to the level and nature of the 
subsidies received by farms.17 
                                                        
15 Woodridge (2009) presents a concise, one-stage formulation of the original Olley and Pakes (1996) 
algorithm using a GMM estimator, which is more efficient but less flexible than the standard Olley-
Pakes methodology. 
16 CAP subsidies are not assigned randomly to farms but depend on regional productivity levels. Farms 
located in more productive regions receive higher subsidies than farms located in less productive 
regions. Historically, this is related to the coupled subsidies, as their value was determined by regional 
yields and animal herd sizes. With the 2003 CAP reform, coupled subsidies were decoupled from 
production but the regional variation in subsidies was largely preserved.  
17 More highly subsidised farms might experience faster technological change. Therefore, we checked 
whether technological change was affected by the level of subsidies by interacting the time trend with 
subsidies, in addition to the fully interacted polynomial. The results were not different from those 
reported in the paper.  
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4. Data and productivity estimates 
We apply our estimation algorithm to the FADN country samples, which are compiled and 
maintained by the European Commission. FADN is a European system of sample surveys 
that take place each year and collect detailed structural and accountancy data on EU farms. 
In total, there is information on about 150 variables on farm structure, yields, outputs, inputs, 
costs, incomes, subsidies and taxes, and various other financial variables. FADN is the only 
source of micro-economic data that is harmonised, as the bookkeeping principles are the 
same across all EU member states. FADN is representative of the commercial agricultural 
holdings in the whole of the EU (European Commission, 2010b). Holdings are selected to 
take part in the surveys on the basis of sampling plans established at the level of each region 
in the EU. The yearly FADN samples cover approximately 80,000 farms and about 90% of 
the utilised agricultural land in the EU-27. 
The panel we employ in the study covers the period 1990–2008 and includes the commercial 
farms defined as in Sckokai and Moro (2009) in all EU-15 member states.18 Our goal is to 
estimate unbiased TFP measures at the farm level, within six (FADN) farm-type samples, for 
each country, and to document the aggregate productivity levels and changes over time and 
by farm type.19 Furthermore, our ultimate goal is to estimate the effect of CAP subsidies on 
farm TFP. The strategy of our empirical analysis implies that we run regressions within the 
six farm-type samples for each country, which leaves us with 83 farm-type country samples, 
with a sufficient number of observations to apply our estimation algorithm. The estimated 
samples account for about 85% of the FADN EU-15 farms.  
The summary statistics for the regression variables are reported in Table 1 and the detail 
definitions, based on the FADN (2010) codebook, are presented in appendix 1. The summary 
statistics show substantial heterogeneity of (average) farms across the EU-15. There is some 
evidence of a north–south divide, but with several exceptions when various indicators are 
considered. In Germany, the Netherlands and Denmark, farms are more capital intensive and 
invest more; these farms are also the largest in terms of output. Not too different from this 
group of countries is Italy, where farms are also relatively large in terms of capital and 
investment but less so in terms of output. The Greek and Portuguese farms are the least 
capital intensive, invest the least and are the smallest in terms of output. Farm employment 
varies less compared to capital across the EU-15 countries, with farms in the Netherlands, the 
UK and Germany appearing to be largest in terms of labour employed.  
There is an even more pronounced north–south differentiation between the member states 
when average subsidies per farm are considered, which is largely determined by the 
differences in farm size. For northern European countries, average farm subsidies range 
roughly between €16,000 and €35,000 (with the highest subsidies being paid to Finnish 
farms), while for southern European countries the subsidies are around or less than €8,000 
per farm. This relationship also holds for subsidy per unit of labour employed. Yet, when 
subsidy per unit of capital is considered, the picture is quite the opposite – southern 
European farms are more heavily subsidised.  
  
                                                        
18 For Austria, Finland and Sweden, which entered the EU in 1995, the period of analysis is 1996–2008. 
19 The six farm types comprise field crop farms, horticultural and vine farms, specialised dairy farms, 
other grazing livestock farms, poultry and pig meat farms, and mixed farms. 
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Table 1. Summary statistics 
Country Investment 
(s.d.) 
Capital 
(s.d.) 
Labour 
(s.d.) 
Materials 
(s.d.) 
Output 
(s.d.) 
Subsidies 
(s.d.) 
Exits 
(No.obs) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Belgium 43.7 
(282.5) 
881.9 
(686.8) 
5131 
(2618) 
76.3 
(67.4) 
141.0 
(106.3) 
23.0 
(14.8) 
0.14 
(14482) 
Denmark 112.8 
(526.6) 
1429.5 
(1763.7) 
4932 
(4713) 
201.6 
(208.2) 
327.3 
(332.1) 
27.0 
(28.5) 
0.26 
(17543) 
Germany 84.1 
(2497.1) 
1841.1 
(5461.1) 
5336 
(7990) 
113.4 
(199.7) 
172.4 
(285.9) 
31.2 
(78.3) 
0.12 
(74777) 
Greece 3.0 
(43.9) 
173.9 
(115.4) 
4301 
(2518) 
14.8 
(13.0) 
38.2 
(22.4) 
7.1 
(10.5) 
0.20 
(17883) 
Spain 32.8 
(1251.6) 
304.7 
(2188.1) 
3399 
(1776) 
29.3 
(39.5) 
60.3 
(57.9) 
8.2 
(11.9) 
0.15 
(58502) 
France 58.5 
(587.1) 
658.8 
(1220.8) 
3821 
(2533) 
67.7 
(52.9) 
117.2 
(91.4) 
21.5 
(22.0) 
0.13 
(93420) 
Ireland 49.6 
(240.3) 
817.6 
(649.8) 
3711 
(1361) 
42.9 
(25.3) 
73.1 
(46.3) 
16.2 
(14.9) 
0.16 
(8230) 
Italy 57.0 
(950.7) 
901.1 
(1735.9) 
4701 
(2805) 
30.9 
(41.7) 
73.1 
(84.2) 
7.9 
(53.7) 
0.29 
(99433) 
Luxembourg 26.7 
(145.6) 
1047.6 
(471.1) 
3697 
(1260) 
69.5 
(36.8) 
117.0 
(56.3) 
31.8 
(22.7) 
0.08 
(4807) 
Netherlands 111.1 
(765.3) 
1588.7 
(1700.5) 
6358 
(6191) 
182.2 
(206.8) 
314.9 
(326.5) 
16.7 
(24.2) 
0.17 
(17290) 
Austria 16.1 
(63.6) 
370.6 
(190.5) 
4178 
(1499) 
33.6 
(19.6) 
63.6 
(32.7) 
19.6 
(11.9) 
0.06 
(17248) 
Portugal 3.6 
(56.2) 
152.4 
(119.9) 
5176 
(2826) 
30.1 
(27.5) 
49.2 
(37.3) 
8.3 
(17.1) 
0.21 
(12343) 
Finland 13.4 
(64.5) 
322.4 
(219.1) 
4577 
(2450) 
67.0 
(50.1) 
83.0 
(70.1) 
34.7 
(24.8) 
0.10 
(7176) 
Sweden 55.1 
(424.3) 
818.4 
(832.4) 
3725 
(1750) 
98.1 
(75.0) 
132.1 
(111.0) 
28.3 
(26.8) 
0.11 
(6645) 
UK 33.5 
(299.6) 
990.3 
(781.2) 
5488 
(3687) 
95.1 
(82.2) 
142.4 
(132.3) 
31.6 
(32.1) 
0.17 
(38405) 
Notes: Mean and standard deviation (s.d.) are reported for each variable. All monetary variables are 
measured in 2000 (€ thousand). Labour is measured in total full-time equivalent hours worked 
annually. The average annual exit rate (Exits) capture farms exiting the sample because of both 
exiting production and the sampling rules. The total number of observations (No.obs) is reported. 
In Table 2 the production function coefficients estimated from the 83 samples are presented 
for each EU-15 member state by aggregating over farm types using output shares as weights. 
There is substantial variation across countries, as the materials coefficient ranges between 
0.59 for Greece and 0.87 for Sweden; the labour coefficient ranges between 0.07 for Ireland 
and 0.26 for Spain and Denmark; and the capital coefficient is between 0.05 for Ireland and 
0.12 for Austria. Farms in most, especially northern European countries, exhibit constant or 
increasing returns to scale, while farms in countries like Greece and Italy are characterised by 
slightly decreasing returns. The (aggregated) adjusted R2 from the second stage of the 
estimation algorithm is quite high, above 0.90 for every country set of regressions, suggesting 
high goodness of fit.  
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Table 2. Production function coefficients and productivity estimates 
Country bm 
(s.e.) 
bl 
(s.e.) 
bk 
(s.e.) 
Adj.R2 
(No.obs) 
TFP index 
(TFP growth) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Belgium 0.68 
(0.03) 
0.24 
(0.04) 
0.08 
(0.02) 
0.98 
(10693) 
1.10 
(-0.63) 
Denmark 0.72 
(0.02) 
0.26 
(0.02) 
0.08 
(0.02) 
0.97 
(10697) 
1.02 
(-0.06) 
Germany 0.84 
(0.01) 
0.17 
(0.01) 
0.07 
(0.01) 
0.93 
(54037) 
1.05 
(+0.63) 
Greece 0.59 
(0.02) 
0.22 
(0.02) 
0.07 
(0.02) 
0.99 
(11957) 
0.73 
(+0.43) 
Spain 0.60 
(0.01) 
0.26 
(0.02) 
0.07 
(0.01) 
0.98 
(32121) 
1.09 
(+1.98) 
France 0.74 
(0.01) 
0.21 
(0.01) 
0.08 
(0.01) 
0.97 
(71274) 
1.01 
(+0.24) 
Ireland 0.80 
(0.02) 
0.07 
(0.02) 
0.05 
(0.02) 
0.98 
(6088) 
1.23 
(-0.59) 
Italy 0.62 
(0.01) 
0.20 
(0.01) 
0.07 
(0.01) 
0.98 
(56977) 
1.10 
(+2.05) 
Luxembourg 0.68 
(0.03) 
0.24 
(0.03) 
0.10 
(0.02) 
0.99 
(3799) 
0.99 
(+0.63) 
Netherlands 0.70 
(0.01) 
0.27 
(0.02) 
0.11 
(0.01) 
0.98 
(12800) 
1.04 
(-0.61) 
Austria 0.62 
(0.02) 
0.20 
(0.02) 
0.12 
(0.02) 
0.99 
(13228) 
1.36 
(+1.44) 
Portugal 0.64 
(0.02) 
0.20 
(0.03) 
0.07 
(0.01) 
0.97 
(8341) 
0.96 
(+1.89) 
Finland 0.68 
(0.03) 
0.16 
(0.02) 
0.11 
(0.02) 
0.93 
(5364) 
1.67 
(-0.78) 
Sweden 0.87 
(0.03) 
0.11 
(0.02) 
0.06 
(0.01) 
0.95 
(4626) 
1.20 
(-0.47) 
UK 0.80 
(0.01) 
0.22 
(0.02) 
0.08 
(0.01) 
0.94 
(27680) 
0.99 
(+0.18) 
Notes: TFP index is an aggregate productivity measure in levels; TFP growth is the aggregate annual 
percentage growth. The total number of observations (No.obs) reported is from the second-step 
estimated sample. 
In the last column (6) of Table 2, both a productivity index (level) and a growth rate are 
reported for each EU-15 country. These two aggregate productivity measures (TFP index and 
TFP growth) are weighted averages of farm-level productivity measures using output shares 
as weights, within and between farm types, thus capturing the farm and sector composition 
effects. As explained by Van Biesebroeck (2008), productivity is intrinsically a relative 
concept. Therefore, for comparative purposes, within each EU-15 country, we define our farm 
productivy measure in levels following Olley and Pakes (1996) as tjtjt tfptfpTFP /= , where 
ttfp  is the average productivity of all farms in period t; the farm productivity growth is 
defined as )/log( 1−=Δ jtjtjt tfptfpTFP .  
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The TFP index ranges between 0.73 in Greece and 1.67 in Finland; a higher index suggests 
that relatively more productive farms and farm sectors dominate, i.e. they have larger market 
shares. Overall, by this measure, the northern European countries appear to have more 
productive farm sectors. The comparison of the TFP growth measures is interesting: average 
annual growth ranges between -0.78% in Finland and +2.05% in Italy. Six small, northern 
European countries show negative productivity growth, while the three largest EU-15 
countries, Germany, France and the UK, all show small but positive productivity growth. The 
highest average, annual productivity growth is recorded by the southern European countries, 
Italy, Portugal and Spain.  
5. Impact of subsidies on productivity: GMM regression analysis 
Our strategy in this section is to verify the effect of subsidies on farm productivity. Subsidies 
are widely used in EU agriculture and the large majority of farms have received subsidies in 
one way or another. Thus, we do not have an easy way to identify treatment and control 
groups. Furthermore, we are interested here in the impact of subsidies on productivity of the 
agricultural sector as a whole. Therefore, we verify the relationship by means of regression 
analysis using the same FADN country samples we used to estimate farm productivity (tfpjt). 
We note that this verification analysis is different from the two-stage analysis in previous 
productivity studies, because in our productivity estimation algorithm we have explicitly 
accounted for the effect of subsidies, and thus our productivity measures are not biased.  
For verification purposes, we specify an estimating equation, linking farm productivity and 
subsidies, using as a basis the inverted investment demand ),,,( jtjtjtjttjt eskih
r=ω  formulated 
in equation (4). We point out that in estimating farm productivity we have explicitly built the 
effect of subsidies into the productivity estimation algorithm (see section 3) and in this 
section we seek only to demonstrate the effect by means of regression analysis. We estimate 
two specifications, in which the dependent variable is measured in levels (log(tfpjt)) and in 
growth rates (log(tfpjt/tfpjt-1)) respectively. The explanatory variables, defined in previous 
sections, are investment (ijt), capital (kjt), subsidies (sjt) and subsidies interacted with a 
dummy capturing the effect of decoupling (sxit); sets of year and farm sector controls are also 
included in every specification. As the main explanatory variables in the estimating equations 
are not strictly exogenous and likely serially correlated, we treat them as predetermined; 
considering the regressors as endogenous does not change the results reported.  
We estimate the productivity and subsidies relationship by Blundell and Bond’s (1998) two-
step system GMM.20 Table 3 reports the regression results (with a two-step robust covariance 
matrix) for levels and growth rates for each of the EU-15 countries. For all regressions, the 
diagnostic tests for no second-order autocorrelation, AR(2), and for the validity of 
instruments, Hansen-J, are satisfied. We find clear evidence that the effect of subsidies 
before decoupling is negative even though the magnitude of the coefficients is quite small 
(between zero and a 3.7% decrease in TFP when subsidies double). Overall, for all countries 
except Portugal and Finland, subsidy coefficients in both the level and the growth equations 
have negative signs. In terms of productivity level, we find a negative and statistically 
significant effect for seven of the EU-15 countries. In terms of productivity growth, the effect 
is negative and statistically significant for ten of the EU-15 countries. Thus, for the period 
before the decoupling of subsidies, no significant negative effect is found in only four of the 
EU-15 countries and in no country is a positive effect is evident. These results are consistent 
with findings by previous productivity studies that employ a two-stage approach to identify 
the CAP subsidy impact on farm efficiency (e.g. Latruffe et al., 2009; Lakner, 2009; Zhu and 
Oude Lansink, 2010). 
                                                        
20 To compensate for the downward bias of the two-step estimates, a finite-sample correction to the 
two-step covariance matrix derived by Windmeijer (2005) is applied.  
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Table 3. GMM estimates of the impact of subsidies on productivity 
Country Specification bI 
(s.e.) 
bK 
(s.e.) 
bS 
(s.e.) 
bSX 
(s.e.) 
AR(2) 
Hansen J 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Belgium Level 0.010 
(0.005) 
0.075 
(0.045) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
0.009 
(0.011) 
0.121 
(0.324) 
 Growth 0.002 
(0.001) 
0.040 
(0.024) 
-0.003 
(0.002) 
0.006 
(0.011) 
0.178 
(0.461) 
Denmark Level 0.002 
(0.001) 
-0.314 
(0.074) 
-0.012 
(0.002) 
0.010 
(0.003) 
0.205 
(0.194) 
 Growth 0.002 
(0.001) 
-0.180 
(0.056) 
-0.003 
(0.002) 
0.012 
(0.004) 
0.183 
(0.344) 
Germany Level 0.008 
(0.002) 
-0.103 
(0.018) 
-0.002 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
0.082 
(0.229) 
 Growth 0.004 
(0.001) 
-0.104 
(0.018) 
-0.003 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
0.114 
(0.215) 
Greece Level 0.006 
(0.002) 
-0.105 
(0.055) 
-0.037 
(0.006) 
-0.017 
(0.007) 
0.181 
(0.402) 
 Growth 0.002 
(0.001) 
-0.036 
(0.016) 
-0.035 
(0.005) 
-0.020 
(0.010) 
0.286 
(0.537) 
Spain Level 0.003 
(0.001) 
-0.179 
(0.057) 
-0.003 
(0.002) 
0.015 
(0.002) 
0.228 
(0.198) 
 Growth 0.003 
(0.001) 
-0.130 
(0.050) 
-0.008 
(0.002) 
0.007 
(0.002) 
0.361 
(0.399) 
France Level 0.004 
(0.002) 
0.063 
(0.031) 
-0.005 
(0.001) 
0.008 
(0.002) 
0.111 
(0.295) 
 Growth 0.004 
(0.002) 
0.047 
(0.026) 
-0.007 
(0.001) 
0.011 
(0.002) 
0.115 
(0.312) 
Ireland Level 0.008 
(0.004) 
0.067 
(0.036) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
0.029 
(0.015) 
0.221 
(0.418) 
 Growth 0.008 
(0.004) 
0.030 
(0.015) 
-0.008 
(0.003) 
0.019 
(0.012) 
0.104 
(0.372) 
Italy Level 0.002 
(0.001) 
0.014 
(0.004) 
-0.003 
(0.003) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.094 
(0.120) 
 Growth 0.005 
(0.003) 
0.048 
(0.021) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
0.017 
(0.005) 
0.195 
(0.210) 
Luxembourg Level 0.003 
(0.001) 
0.021 
(0.011) 
-0.003 
(0.001) 
0.054 
(0.016) 
0.225 
(0.580) 
 Growth 0.004 
(0.002) 
0.030 
(0.011) 
-0.005 
(0.002) 
0.042 
(0.016) 
0.098 
(0.321) 
Netherlands Level 0.002 
(0.001) 
-0.188 
(0.036) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
0.003 
(0.001) 
0.080 
(0.229) 
 Growth 0.002 
(0.001) 
-0.281 
(0.071) 
-0.004 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.117 
(0.198) 
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Table 3. Continued 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Austria Level 0.002 
(0.001) 
-0.084 
(0.029) 
-0.009 
(0.002) 
-0.009 
(0.010) 
0.224 
(0.154) 
 Growth 0.009 
(0.004) 
-0.062 
(0.009) 
-0.012 
(0.002) 
-0.005 
(0.012) 
0.168 
(0.188) 
Portugal Level 0.002 
(0.001) 
0.002 
(0.001) 
0.004 
(0.004) 
0.004 
(0.006) 
0.106 
(0.115) 
 Growth 0.015 
(0.007) 
0.024 
(0.008) 
0.004 
(0.004) 
0.008 
0.008) 
0.241 
(0.298) 
Finland Level 0.007 
(0.003) 
0.070 
(0.028) 
0.015 
(0.017) 
0.039 
(0.020) 
0.221 
(0.351) 
 Growth 0.008 
(0.004) 
0.058 
(0.022) 
0.017 
(0.012) 
0.055 
(0.018) 
0.102 
(0.282) 
Sweden Level 0.009 
(0.003) 
0.086 
(0.036) 
-0.003 
(0.006) 
0.002 
(0.006) 
0.248 
(0.526) 
 Growth 0.006 
(0.002) 
0.036 
(0.018) 
-0.019 
(0.008) 
-0.008 
(0.005) 
0.150 
(0.138) 
UK Level 0.013 
(0.006) 
-0.150 
(0.043) 
-0.013 
(0.002) 
-0.005 
(0.002) 
0.219 
(0.438) 
 Growth 0.010 
(0.003) 
-0.153 
(0.035) 
-0.009 
(0.002) 
-0.003 
(0.002) 
0.193 
(0.278) 
Notes: The estimated samples cover the period 1991–2008 (1996–2008 for Austria, Finland and Sweden). 
The diagnostics reported are the p-values for the AR(2) test and for the Hansen J test (in 
parentheses). In all the estimated equations, the year and farm type controls are included. The 
coefficients of the subsidy variable (pre- and post-decoupling), where significant at 5% or better, are 
denoted in bold. 
For the period after decoupled subsidies, where introduced the effect on farm productivity is 
more diverse. In fact, for ten of the EU-15 countries the subsidy coefficient is positive even 
though it is statistically significant for only six countries in the level equation as well as in the 
growth equation. We find a statistically significant negative effect in only two countries: 
about 2% (when subsidies double) in both the level and the growth equations for Greece, 
while for the UK we find a small negative effect of 0.5% (if subsidies double) solely in the 
level equation. Interestingly, the group of countries for which a switch of effect, from negative 
to positive after decoupling is observed, is mixed, including both northern and southern 
member states. Overall, after decoupling we find that subsidies have either no effect or a 
small positive effect on productivity in the majority of the EU-15 countries. Our findings are 
consistent with those of Zhu et al. (2012) and Mary (2012). They do not investigate the 
decoupled payments but consider the impact of partial decoupling (e.g. the introduction of 
Agenda 2000). The former study finds that a higher degree of coupling in farm support 
negatively affects farm efficiency, whereas the latter study finds that the Agenda 2000 reform 
had a positive impact on productivity. 
Clearly the impact of subsidies depends on their type. Our results provide evidence that 
coupled subsidies indeed distort farm behaviour (e.g. production structure or input allocation, 
or both) leading to productivity loss. Furthermore, owing to the allocative inefficiency, 
monitoring costs and payment uncertainty, coupled subsidies are expected to stimulate less 
credit and hence also intensify less productive investment compared with decoupled 
payments. It should further be noted that a significant part of the coupled payments could be 
leaked away to other agents through changes in market prices; the effect diminishes farms’ 
benefits from subsidies. The leakage is positively correlated with coupling because it implies 
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a stronger link of subsidies to farm activities and thus a stronger impact on the aggregate 
price level (Floyd, 1965; Alston and James, 2002). 
Compared with coupled subsidies, the results indicate that in countries where positive effects 
are observed, decoupled subsidies likely affect farm productivity through the ‘credit channel’. 
Subsidies allow farms to improve their credit position or reduce the cost of borrowing for 
investments (or both), thus boosting their productivity. Furthermore, the observed positive 
effect could also stem from subsidies reducing risk aversion, which ensures that the farm 
productivity adjustment is more active. For the cases where a negative effect of subsidies 
after decoupling is still observed, this could be owing to either insignificant market 
imperfections (credit problems) in the agricultural sector (e.g. Germany, the UK and Sweden) 
or partial decoupling21 (e.g. Greece) or a combination of the two factors (e.g. Austria). For 
example, if farm credit problems are insignificant, there is minor or no gain from subsidising 
credit and investment. Partial decoupling means that a share of subsidies is kept coupled 
with the introduction of the Single Payment Scheme in 2005–06, which may lead to 
efficiency losses because of the persistence of production distortions that may offset partly or 
fully the gains from alleviating market imperfections. 
6. Summary and conclusion 
The focus of this paper is on evaluating the impact of CAP subsidies on the total factor 
productivity of EU commercial farms. The paper also documents aggregate productivity 
differences across the EU member states and FADN farm types (sectors) using micro data. 
We build a structural model of the unobserved productivity directly incorporating the effects 
of farm subsidies and adapt the semi-parametric estimation algorithm proposed by Olley and 
Pakes (1996) to estimate the parameters of production functions within the FADN farm-type 
samples, for each of the EU-15 countries over the period 1990–96 to 2008. We control for 
differences in the economic environment across narrowly defined spatial units and model 
productivity as a non-parametric function of investment and state variables, including farm 
subsidies, which greatly enhances our ability to obtain consistent estimates of the production 
function parameters and thus back out unbiased TFP measures at the farm level.  
We aggregate the farm productivity by country and farm type and find some evidence that the 
aggregate productivity level and growth systematically differ between the northern and 
southern sets of European countries. Our farm-level regression analysis, for each of the EU-
15 countries, clearly demonstrates the impact of CAP subsidies on farm TFP. We find that 
subsidies had a negative impact on farm productivity in the period before the decoupling 
reform was implemented; after decoupling, in 2005–06, the effect of subsidies on 
productivity was more nuanced, as in several countries it turned positive. Theoretically, the 
impact of subsidies on productivity is a net effect of allocative efficiency losses and the 
investment-induced productivity gains caused by the interaction of market imperfections 
with the subsidy. We do not identify the two effects separately; we only infer their relative 
importance from the net effect. A caveat we need to acknowledge is that our results are based 
on an EU-15 sample, which consists of the more developed economies in Europe where 
market failures are less pronounced. The results might be different for a sample of the less 
developed new member states, where the credit-alleviation effect of subsidies might be 
stronger.  
Our findings are consistent with the literature emphasising the inefficiencies of public 
subsidisation of production and at the same time lend support to the EU policy of decoupling 
CAP subsidies. The results suggest that the decoupled payments are less distortive and 
                                                        
21 With the introduction of decoupled payments, countries could still allocate part of the total subsidy 
envelope to coupled payments, such as arable crop payments, sheep and goat payments, and the suckle 
cow premium (Council of the European Union, 2003). Examples of countries that maintained a 
significant level of coupled payments include Austria, Greece, Italy and Portugal. 
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enhance productivity, which is consistent with the WTO’s priorities. From a food security 
perspective, the evidence indicates possible improvements in future food availability through 
the increasing productive capacity of the EU’s agricultural sector. The 2011 European 
Commission proposal for the post-2013 CAP suggests maintaining the decoupled subsidies 
system after 2013, thus likely ensuring continued future enhancement of EU farm 
productivity. Our analyses suggest that the positive productivity effect of decoupled subsidies 
is likely induced by correcting for inefficiencies in the agricultural sector related to credit 
access and risk attitudes. However, one should be careful in drawing conclusions regarding 
general welfare implications from this, since the analysis does not account for the distortions 
of the taxation funding the subsidy. 
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Appendix 1. Definitions of regression variables 
All monetary variables are transformed to real values using the EU KLEMS (2011) 
agricultural sector output and input deflators with 2000 as a base year. In the definitions of 
regression variables, we refer to the FADN variable codes (FADN, 2010).  
Output is defined as the real value of total annual output (SE131). Labour is total full-time 
equivalent labour input (SE011) measured in hours worked annually. Materials measure 
variable costs and consist of total annual specific costs (SE281) plus total annual farming 
overheads (SE336), which represent current costs that are not linked to specific lines of 
production. Total annual specific costs include all variable costs incurred in crop and animal 
production (e.g. fertilizers, seeds and crop protection products). Total farming overheads also 
contain the current costs of machinery and buildings as well as the costs of contractors linked 
to work carried out by contractors and to machinery hire. In their nature these costs are 
variable, as the decisions on them are usually made within the current period. Furthermore, 
it is impossible to separate and capitalise the cost of machinery rented from the contactors’ 
labour costs. Therefore we add all these to our variable cost measure.  
Subsidies include all payments to farms – total subsidies excluding subsidies on investment 
(SE605) plus subsidies on investment (SE406). Thus, our measure of subsidies captures all 
the external cash flows paid to the farm under various CAP components. To capture the 
change in regime and in the nature of subsidies after decoupling, we also interact the subsidy 
variable with a dummy indicating the time of implementation of the decoupling policy. The 
dummy equals one from 2005 onwards for Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, 
Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal, Sweden and the UK; it equals one from 2006 onwards for 
Finland, France, Greece, the Netherlands and Spain.  
Calculating our capital measure is more complicated. In FADN, the reported total fixed 
assets (SE441) only cover the capital owned by the farm. However, leasing in land and 
buildings is widespread in EU agriculture (Sckokai and Moro, 2009). For our analysis, we 
need a measure of total fixed capital used in production. Therefore our strategy, similar to 
Olley and Pakes (1996) is to estimate the capital value of assets rented long term and add it to 
the value of the total fixed assets owned. We do the calculations in two steps: first, we 
determine the rental value of land and buildings. Second, we estimate the rate of return on 
land and buildings for narrowly defined spatial units and eight farm types (NUTS3 and by 
FADN TF8). Finally, we discount the rental payments using the estimated rate of return as 
the discount rate.  
To calculate the rental payment per hectare, we divide the rent paid (SE375) for farmland 
and buildings by the utilised agricultural area (UAA)rented (SE030). The value of land and 
buildings owned is calculated using the balance sheet value of land, permanent crops and 
quotas (SE446), and buildings (SE450). To calculate the land and buildings price per hectare, 
we divide this value by the difference of total UAA (SE025) and the UAA rented (SE030). 
Then we calculate the rate of return by dividing the rental payment per hectare by the price 
per hectare. From the farm-specific rates of return we calculate median rates of return for 
narrowly defined special units – for each NUTS3 region by FADN TF8 farm type. We note 
that using the regional median rather than the farm-specific rate of return circumvents 
inconsistencies in data, such as the coexistence of positive values of rent paid and zero values 
of UAA rented. Finally, we use the median rates of return to discount (in perpetuity) the total 
rental payments (SE375), which gives us the capital value of the land and buildings rented. 
Capital (the total fixed capital) used in production is a sum of the value of the capital rented 
and the total fixed assets owned (SE441).  
Investment (I) is the total net investment and it is constructed in a manner similar to Olley 
and Pakes (1996) and Rizov and Walsh (2009) from the annually observed, total fixed capital 
stock (K) using the perpetual inventory method: It = Kt+1 – (1-δ) Kt, where t is the time period 
and δ is the depreciation rate. Thus, our investment measure captures investment in total 
fixed capital, both owned and rented.  
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Appendix 2. Production function coefficients and productivity estimates 
Table A1. Production function coefficients and productivity estimates 
Country Farm 
sector 
bm 
(s.e.) 
bl 
(s.e.) 
bk 
(s.e.) 
Adj.R2 
(No.obs) 
TFP index 
(TFP growth) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Belgium FC 0.66 
(0.06) 
0.17 
(0.05) 
0.12 
(0.02) 
0.99 
(1019) 
1.02 
(-0.38) 
 HC 0.59 
(0.02) 
0.39 
(0.04) 
0.05 
(0.02) 
0.98 
(1765) 
1.07 
(+0.46) 
 MK 0.66 
(0.02) 
0.14 
(0.03) 
0.08 
(0.02) 
0.99 
(2589) 
2.23 
(+3.94) 
 PA 0.73 
(0.03) 
0.25 
(0.04) 
0.16 
(0.02) 
0.96 
(1818) 
0.21 
(-3.85) 
 PP 0.72 
(0.06) 
0.18 
(0.06) 
0.10 
(0.01) 
0.98 
(1005) 
0.72 
(-1.72) 
 MX 0.76 
(0.02) 
0.16 
(0.03) 
0.07 
(0.02) 
0.99 
(2497) 
0.69 
(-0.86) 
Denmark FC 0.64 
(0.03) 
0.42 
(0.03) 
0.08 
(0.03) 
0.96 
(1763) 
0.73 
(+0.34) 
 HC 0.66 
(0.02) 
0.45 
(0.02) 
0.05 
(0.01) 
0.92 
(1785) 
0.68 
(+0.07) 
 MK 0.66 
(0.02) 
0.20 
(0.02) 
0.18 
(0.01) 
1.00 
(3395) 
0.97 
(-0.66) 
 PP 0.78 
(0.01) 
0.15 
(0.02) 
0.06 
(0.01) 
0.99 
(1547) 
1.54 
(-0.21) 
 MX 0.79 
(0.02) 
0.23 
(0.02) 
0.04 
(0.02) 
0.96 
(2207) 
1.02 
(+0.31) 
Germany FC 0.85 
(0.01) 
0.22 
(0.01) 
0.08 
(0.01) 
0.91 
(12135) 
0.94 
(+1.35) 
 HC 0.70 
(0.01) 
0.29 
(0.02) 
0.06 
(0.01) 
0.97 
(7191) 
1.47 
(+0.04) 
 MK 0.82 
(0.01) 
0.14 
(0.01) 
0.07 
(0.01) 
0.98 
(16358) 
1.63 
(-1.42) 
 PA 0.84 
(0.01) 
0.18 
(0.01) 
0.06 
(0.01) 
0.93 
(1745) 
0.95 
(+0.88) 
 PP 0.86 
(0.02) 
0.12 
(0.02) 
0.06 
(0.01) 
0.91 
(1987) 
1.21 
(-0.63) 
 MX 0.92 
(0.01) 
0.14 
(0.01) 
0.06 
(0.01) 
0.89 
(14621) 
0.90 
(+1.15) 
Greece FC 0.62 
(0.02) 
0.22 
(0.02) 
0.05 
(0.02) 
0.99 
(6020) 
0.59 
(+0.48) 
 HC 0.47 
(0.03) 
0.27 
(0.04) 
0.14 
(0.03) 
0.99 
(3181) 
0.68 
(+1.01) 
 MK 0.54 
(0.01) 
0.23 
(0.01) 
0.12 
(0.01) 
0.99 
(120) 
0.56 
(+1.43) 
 PA 0.51 
(0.03) 
0.13 
(0.03) 
0.10 
(0.02) 
1.00 
(1720) 
1.66 
(+1.06) 
 PP 0.54 
(0.01) 
0.23 
(0.01) 
0.12 
(0.01) 
0.99 
(111) 
0.54 
(-2.32) 
 MX 0.51 
(0.03) 
0.09 
(0.04) 
0.05 
(0.02) 
1.00 
(805) 
2.00 
(+2.14) 
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Table A1. Continued 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Spain FC 0.58 
(0.02) 
0.30 
(0.02) 
0.07 
(0.01) 
0.98 
(3213) 
0.56 
(+4.06) 
 HC 0.45 
(0.01) 
0.42 
(0.02) 
0.06 
(0.01) 
0.99 
(10223) 
2.15 
(+1.52) 
 MK 0.65 
(0.01) 
0.11 
(0.01) 
0.08 
(0.01) 
0.99 
(9446) 
0.97 
(+0.68) 
 PA 0.55 
(0.02) 
0.34 
(0.02) 
0.02 
(0.01) 
0.98 
(4879) 
0.80 
(+0.49) 
 PP 0.65 
(0.01) 
0.23 
(0.03) 
0.05 
(0.01) 
0.98 
(2186) 
0.68 
(+0.65) 
 MX 0.64 
(0.02) 
0.23 
(0.03) 
0.05 
(0.01) 
0.98 
(2174) 
0.66 
(+2.02) 
France FC 0.81 
(0.02) 
0.16 
(0.01) 
0.11 
(0.01) 
0.96 
(22019) 
0.74 
(+0.10) 
 HC 0.58 
(0.01) 
0.34 
(0.01) 
0.10 
(0.01) 
0.98 
(15664) 
1.71 
(+1.19) 
 MK 0.74 
(0.01) 
0.14 
(0.01) 
0.07 
(0.01) 
0.99 
(11166) 
1.37 
(-1.39) 
 PA 0.78 
(0.01) 
0.15 
(0.01) 
0.06 
(0.01) 
0.97 
(10543) 
0.78 
(-0.95) 
 PP 0.78 
(0.02) 
0.20 
(0.03) 
0.04 
(0.01) 
0.98 
(1176) 
1.11 
(-1.01) 
 MX 0.86 
(0.02) 
0.16 
(0.03) 
0.04 
(0.01) 
0.93 
(10706) 
0.73 
(+0.68) 
Ireland FC 0.81 
(0.02) 
0.11 
(0.02) 
0.06 
(0.01) 
0.98 
(258) 
0.64 
(-3.07) 
 MK 0.80 
(0.02) 
0.05 
(0.02) 
0.04 
(0.01) 
0.99 
(3736) 
1.43 
(-1.42) 
 PA 0.79 
(0.04) 
0.19 
(0.04) 
0.13 
(0.03) 
0.93 
(1627) 
0.86 
(+4.80) 
 MX 0.81 
(0.05) 
0.22 
(0.05) 
0.06 
(0.03) 
0.89 
(467) 
0.60 
(+0.41) 
Italy FC 0.66 
(0.01) 
0.22 
(0.01) 
0.08 
(0.01) 
0.98 
(16278) 
0.59 
(+2.05) 
 HC 0.52 
(0.01) 
0.26 
(0.01) 
0.09 
(0.01) 
0.99 
(20616) 
1.54 
(+2.12) 
 MK 0.77 
(0.01) 
0.08 
(0.01) 
0.07 
(0.01) 
0.99 
(9274) 
0.93 
(+1.94) 
 PA 0.66 
(0.01) 
0.15 
(0.01) 
0.03 
(0.01) 
0.99 
(5738) 
1.29 
(-1.07) 
 MX 0.70 
(0.01) 
0.10 
(0.01) 
0.06 
(0.01) 
0.99 
(5071) 
0.85 
(+0.70) 
Luxembourg HC 0.51 
(0.06) 
0.39 
(0.09) 
0.15 
(0.04) 
0.99 
(261) 
2.58 
(+1.51) 
 MK 0.65 
(0.02) 
0.26 
(0.01) 
0.10 
(0.03) 
1.00 
(2468) 
0.93 
(+0.66) 
 PA 0.75 
(0.02) 
0.16 
(0.03) 
0.09 
(0.03) 
0.98 
(477) 
1.73 
(-1.84) 
 MX 0.87 
(0.04) 
0.13 
(0.04) 
0.09 
(0.04) 
0.94 
(593) 
0.73 
(+0.99) 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Netherlands FC 0.73 
(0.02) 
0.20 
(0.02) 
0.16 
(0.02) 
0.98 
(2169) 
0.61 
(+0.11) 
 HC 0.67 
(0.01) 
0.32 
(0.01) 
0.08 
(0.01) 
0.98 
(4016) 
1.22 
(-0.73) 
 MK 0.73 
(0.02) 
0.23 
(0.01) 
0.16 
(0.02) 
0.99 
(3958) 
1.29 
(-0.72) 
 PA 0.73 
(0.05) 
0.47 
(0.08) 
0.06 
(0.03) 
0.89 
(484) 
0.88 
(-0.70) 
 PP 0.78 
(0.03) 
0.17 
(0.03) 
0.06 
(0.01) 
0.98 
(1734) 
1.59 
(+0.36) 
 MX 0.78 
(0.03) 
0.24 
(0.05) 
0.10 
(0.02) 
0.96 
(439) 
0.54 
(+2.60) 
Austria FC 0.67 
(0.03) 
0.20 
(0.03) 
0.18 
(0.03) 
0.99 
(2471) 
0.83 
(+0.67) 
 HC 0.57 
(0.05) 
0.39 
(0.06) 
0.24 
(0.05) 
0.96 
(891) 
0.70 
(+3.97) 
 MK 0.56 
(0.02) 
0.19 
(0.02) 
0.12 
(0.02) 
0.99 
(5279) 
1.90 
(+1.03) 
 PA 0.56 
(0.03) 
0.21 
(0.03) 
0.15 
(0.04) 
0.99 
(1304) 
1.02 
(+3.39) 
 PP 0.86 
(0.04) 
0.14 
(0.03) 
0.11 
(0.02) 
0.95 
(1048) 
0.90 
(+3.04) 
 MX 0.72 
(0.03) 
0.20 
(0.02) 
0.05 
(0.02) 
0.98 
(2235) 
0.97 
(-3.11) 
Portugal FC 0.63 
(0.03) 
0.24 
(0.03) 
0.02 
(0.01) 
0.96 
(1162) 
1.52 
(+1.34) 
 HC 0.53 
(0.03) 
0.43 
(0.04) 
0.09 
(0.03) 
0.92 
(2225) 
0.53 
(+1.63) 
 MK 0.70 
(0.03) 
0.09 
(0.01) 
0.07 
(0.02) 
0.99 
(3468) 
1.01 
(+1.77) 
 PA 0.62 
(0.03) 
0.18 
(0.05) 
0.02 
(0.01) 
0.98 
(731) 
1.16 
(+0.21) 
 PP 0.74 
(0.05) 
0.24 
(0.07) 
0.10 
(0.04) 
0.98 
(255) 
1.77 
(+4.50) 
 MX 0.63 
(0.01) 
0.22 
(0.01) 
0.02 
(0.01) 
0.96 
(500) 
1.17 
(+1.40) 
Finland FC 0.85 
(0.05) 
0.23 
(0.05) 
0.13 
(0.04) 
0.82 
(825) 
0.73 
(+0.24) 
 HC 0.73 
(0.04) 
0.32 
(0.05) 
0.08 
(0.03) 
0.89 
(510) 
0.75 
(-0.21) 
 MK 0.52 
(0.03) 
0.13 
(0.02) 
0.11 
(0.01) 
1.00 
(2911) 
2.28 
(-0.57) 
 PA 0.85 
(0.02) 
0.20 
(0.02) 
0.07 
(0.01) 
0.82 
(184) 
0.71 
(+1.52) 
 PP 0.85 
(0.05) 
0.16 
(0.06) 
0.03 
(0.01) 
0.87 
(426) 
0.75 
(-0.97) 
 MX 0.84 
(0.02) 
0.20 
(0.02) 
0.08 
(0.02) 
0.82 
(508) 
0.61 
(-2.11) 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Sweden FC 0.85 
(0.07) 
0.13 
(0.05) 
0.06 
(0.03) 
0.96 
(982) 
0.93 
(-0.23) 
 MK 0.88 
(0.02) 
0.12 
(0.02) 
0.03 
(0.01) 
0.91 
(2539) 
1.43 
(-0.93) 
 PA 0.84 
(0.07) 
0.30 
(0.10) 
0.11 
(0.04) 
0.74 
(222) 
0.71 
(+0.91) 
 PP 0.87 
(0.04) 
0.14 
(0.06) 
0.05 
(0.02) 
0.93 
(309) 
0.82 
(-1.36) 
 MX 0.93 
(0.02) 
0.12 
(0.02) 
0.05 
(0.01) 
0.76 
(574) 
0.85 
(+1.88) 
UK FC 0.75 
(0.02) 
0.27 
(0.02) 
0.06 
(0.01) 
0.94 
(5551) 
1.41 
(-0.22) 
 HC 0.78 
(0.03) 
0.28 
(0.03) 
0.07 
(0.02) 
0.87 
(1245) 
0.84 
(-0.10) 
 MK 0.83 
(0.01) 
0.17 
(0.01) 
0.09 
(0.01) 
0.97 
(7543) 
0.92 
(-0.65) 
 PA 0.88 
(0.02) 
0.26 
(0.02) 
0.08 
(0.01) 
0.94 
(10159) 
0.72 
(+0.98) 
 PP 0.70 
(0.04) 
0.31 
(0.04) 
0.05 
(0.02) 
0.96 
(810) 
2.10 
(+0.45) 
 MX 0.82 
(0.02) 
0.24 
(0.03) 
0.05 
(0.02) 
0.92 
(2372) 
0.92 
(+0.55) 
Notes: The farm type codes are FC – field crop farms; HC – horticulture, wine and greenhouse farms; MK – 
milk farms; PA – pasture farms; PP – poultry and pig meat farms; MX – mixed farms. The TFP 
index is an aggregate productivity measure in levels and the TFP growth is the aggregate annual 
percentage growth over all farms in each farm type for the period 1991–2008 (1996–2008 for 
Austria, Finland and Sweden).  
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